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Africa's Contemporary Global Migrations:
Patterns, Perils, and Possibilities
Paul T. Zeleza
The literature on international migration is dominated by
economic and political perspectives. This paper begins with the
culturalist readings to remind ourselves that there is more to
international migration than the search for greener pastures or
flight from political terror. It is about the movement of human
beings, a story that is as old as humanity itself, going back to the
great migrations within and out of Africa to populate the planet.
But those who advance the culturalist perspectives also need to
be reminded that in our contemporary world more often than
not people migrate to sell their labor power and that the patterns
of migration, labor procurement and utilization are conditioned
by the dynamics of capitalist development, expansion, and
accumulation. This is an argument for interdisciplinarity, the
need for multiple perspectives on the exceedingly complex
phenomenon of international migration.
1978, Ali Mazrui (1978) argued in his book, Political Values and the Educated
s in Africa that Africa needed to domesticate, decolonize, and diversify the
ject of western modernity through what he called the strategy of counter-
etration, a multiple project of engagement and entry into the economic and
I ural heartlands ofthe West. For Mazrui, then, migrant African elites including
llectuals were crusaders for African racial redemption and civilizational
ence in the world concert of cultures. More extravagant claims for migrant
. es were made by Edward Said (1993) in his book, Culture and Imperialism, in
ich he saw Third World elites exiled in the North as cosmopolitan combatants,
on whose hybrid shoulders rested the liberation of both the western and
t-colonial worlds. For Arjun Appadurai (1996) in his book, Modernity at
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Large, mass migration is one of the twin forces that characterizes the current
age of globalization, the other being electronic mediation. Migration, from his
perspective, is a product of and produces globalization as a constellation of
cultural flows that create a transnational world configured around postnational
networks of diasporas.
My presentation is divided into five parts. First, I examine the scale of
contemporary global migrations, and second, of Africans' global migrations.
Third, I analyze the forces behind it, briefly probing the various theories that have
been advanced to explain international migration. Fourth, I survey the question
of the "brain drain" and its developmental implications for Africa. I conclude by
making a few suggestions on ways ofturning Africa's contemporary migrants into a
productive and progressive diaspora for Africa's development and global presence.
Dynamics and Directions ofGlobal Mobility
The late 20th century has been characterized as the age ofglobalization marked by
the rapid movements of capital, commodities, and cultures across communities,
countries, and continents. To what extent can it also be seen as "the age of
migration;' to quote the title of Castles and Miller's (1998) book? Going by the
hysterical pronouncements of politicians and the media, and the inflated rhetoric
by the academic seers of globalization one would think the world is undergoing
massive and unprecedented waves of international migration. The reality is far
more complex. The available evidence points to two broad conclusions. First,
while the number of international migrants has grown significantly in absolute
numbers since the 1960s, the percentage of people who have left and remained
outside their countries of origin has remained remarkably steady and small.
Second, there have been significant changes in the character and direction
of international migration. The number of foreign-born persons, including
migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers, worldwide increased from 75.5 million
in 1960 to 190.6 million in 2005, implying an annual growth rate of 3.4%, which
was only slightly above the global population growth rate, but far below the rate
of international tourist arrivals during the same period, let alone the phenomenal
growth in world trade and capital flows. The change in the proportion ofmigrants
in the world population changed only slightly, from 2.5% in 1960 to 3% in 2005
(United Nations Population Division, 2006).
In all world regions there was an absolute growth in the numbers of migrants
between 1960 and 2005. Europe overtook Asia as the region with the largest
number of migrants as its migrant population more than quadrupled to 64.1
million, compared to Asia's which rose from 28.5 to 53.3 million. Also experiencing
fast growth was North America whose migrant population more than tripled,
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hat of Oceania more than doubled but only from 2.1 million to 5 million.
erica and the Caribbean's migrant population experienced the slowest
, from six million to 6.6 million. Altogether, Asia, Latin American, and
ia experienced declines in their percentage of the global stock of migrants,
it rose for Europe and Northern America. Also, less remarkable than often
"""""," ...~_,..,,..t, has been the proportion of women among international immigrants; it
- om 46.6% in 1960 to 48.8% in 2000.
hile the quantitative magnitude of international migration is not as
i e as it is often assumed, the changes in the composition and direction
rnational migration have been quite profound. We can isolate two critical
pments. First, there has been growing diversification of sending and
ing countries. Second, skilled migration has assumed greater importance
. terms of the actual flows and in the formulation of migration policies at
a!, regional, and international levels. In terms of regional destinations, the
of the least and less developed countries declined from 65.7% in 1960 to
. 2005, while that of the developed countries rose from 42.8% to 60.5%. It
ent that the flows of international migration have shifted from the global
o the global North.
many European Union countries the leading countries of origin of
1.:..J,;,.W.lO.I"".'U,~J.tS are the EU countries themselves (Fassman and Munz, 1994), just as
lk of migrants from the developing countries still go to other developing
ies-47% compared to 40% who reside in the high income OECD
ies (Ratha and Shaw, 2007). By 2004 there were still few countries from
bal South that featured among the top five sources of immigrants for the
hough the numbers ofmigrants from the global South to the global North
Her than is often postulated, their growth play an increasingly important
the politics of state renewal, national memory and forgetting, and social
and control. The assimilationist promises of previous intra-Northern
ion flows have been shattered as the racialization of Southern immigrants
en a new intensity (Bolaria and Bolaria, 1997). In many of these countries
rants have become an alibi for national failings; their presence serves both
reads that tie the nation together and threats that tear asunder the cherished
increasingly troubled marriage between nation and state.
There are considerable temporal, national, and regional variations in the
ration patterns to the global North. The available data shows that until the
-1990s international migration was more pronounced in the traditional
ntries of immigration, such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, than
any parts of Europe. The scale of the immigration gap between the "settler»
tries and the European countries can be gauged from the fact that between
and 2004 the annual net number of migrants for the United States was 1.4
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million compared to 1.1 million for Europe. The 2005 foreign born population
in the United States estimated at 38.4 million was nearly one and a half times the
combined foreign born population of Germany) France) the United Kingdom)
and Spain. But the «non-settler)) OECD countries in Europe have been catching
up in the relative size of their immigrant and foreign born populations. In 2000)
the percentage of foreign born in the United States and Sweden was about the
same about 12% (OECD) 2006).
Migration to the global North over the last two decades has been characterized
by several new trends amidst the persistence of old ones. Many governments are
pursuing a two track policy: the recruitment of highly skilled immigrants who are
provided with opportunities for permanent settlement and citizenship) and the
resort to temporary immigrants for low-skilled work to meet labor market needs.
As part of the drive for greater selectivity; there is fierce competition for international
students as potential skilled immigrants) sometimes accompanied by acceleration
of asylum requests and periodic regularization programs. In the meantime) the
recourse to seasonal workers has been accompanied by more restrictive measures and
tighter border controls to combat illegal entry and trafficking) and more aggressive
repatriation policies (OECD) 2006) p. 76-110; Massey) 1999).
Not only has the foreign labor force grown in almost all the OECD countries)
it has spread to more sectors) including the services and self-employment) although
foreigners continue to be more vulnerable to unemployment than nationals
particularly in Europe. For many OECD countries the need to import labor from
the global South is likely to accelerate as domestic fertility rates continue to fall and
ageing of the native population and dependency ratios rise. On the whole) while
there has been an increase in the relative importance ofhighly-skilled and low-skilled
temporary workers in the total flows) and a decrease in the number ofasylum claims)
immigration for family reunio11 continues to predominate in many OECD countries)
ranging from more than 60% for the United States) Sweden) Norway) and France in
2004) to more than 40% for Austria) the Netherlands) and Switzerland.
Patterns ofContemporary African Global Migrations
How do African patterns of contemporary global migrations compare to the
other world regions? As elsewhere Africa)s migrant population increased) nearly
doubling from 9.1 million to 17.1 million) but like the other regions in global
South-Asia) Latin American) and the Caribbean and Oceania-Africa)s share'
of the world)s migrant stock declined from 12.1% in 1960 to 9% in 2005. There
was also a decline in the share of migrants in the African population) from 3.2%
to 1.9%. Also similar to other world regions has been the growing feminization
of African migrants as more women migrate independently through legal and
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ionally irregular channels to seek better lives for themselves and their
i ies. The growth in the share of female migrants in sub-Saharan Africa rose
40.6% in 1960 to 47.2% in 2000, while for North Africa it declined from
-% in 1960 to 42.8% in 2000 to become the second lowest in the world after
hern Asia (Zlotnik, 2003).
Clearly, there are many similarities between migration trends in Africa and
r world regions. But there are also differences of magnitude. Three notable
res of Africa's international migration are worth noting. First, the vast
rity of the continent's migrants go to other African countries. Second, an
ually large percentage of the migrants are made up of refugees. Third, the
ers ofAfrican migrants flocking to the global North remain relatively small,
ugh they are growing rapidly, and Africa claims the dubious distinction of
ing the largest share of its skilled workers compared to any other region.
frica's international migrants within the continent are unevenly spread.
rding to the 2005 World Migration Report, «In 2000, 42 per cent were Ii ving
st Africa, 28 per cent in East Africa, 12 per cent in northern Africa, and
cent in central and southern Africa" (10M, 2006, p. 36). Many of these
-border migrants include labor migrants seeking improved living standards
.ghboring countries, communities in border regions that engage in perpetual
of traditional and livelihood migrations between countries, and refugees
from political conflicts and environmental crises. In 2004 there were 2.4
n economically active migrants in other African countries.
fa-regional migration flows within Africa have tended to be concentrated
ndful of countries, although the composition of these countries has shifted
ime, such as Cote d'Ivoire in West Africa before the end of the economic
1 and onset of civil war, Libya in North Africa, Kenya in East Africa, and
frica following the demise of apartheid, although South Africans are
o exaggerate the immigrants waves allegedly swamping their country.
e unusual characteristic of African migrants is the relatively high
1'-"',,",J,lLage of refugees. While the world average of refugees among migrants in
as 7.1 %, for Africa it was 17.7%, although by then in absolute numbers
d the biggest refugee population-7.8 million compared to Africa's three
~_"''-''.&..l. The percentage of refugees in the African migrant population was even
in 1980 (25.4%) and 1990 (32.7%). As might be expected the composition
ee sending and refugee- receiving countries has changed over the last
a half decades as the theatres of political conflict, human rights abuses,
...:_'.... _J~J.I.lie stagnation and environmental disasters, the principal causes of refugee
ion, have shifted (Adelman and Sorenson, 1994; Kibreab, 1985, 1996;
~£~a~(loer, 2006; Degu, 2007; Veney) 2007).





















Notwithstanding the persistence and predominance of migrati n
the continent, there is no doubt that Africa's international migration h
growing rapidly. As is true of international migration in general accura
are difficult to come by, but the available estimates point to an incontr
trend. Three observations can be made about Africa's migrations to oth
regions in terms of their spatial concentration and social compo iti
Africa's transcontinental migrants largely flock to the global North r
to regions in the global South. There are of course some notable
large numbers of migrants from parts of northeastern Africa ha
the Gulf States. Second, African migrants to the global North en'
of education. Finally, as restrictive immigration policies have been au,-"V'-\',"-l
selectivity preferences increased in Europe and North Americ
illegal migrations have been on the rise for unskilled workers.
stories of West Africans trying to get into Spain are a recent mani.~VOII.UlI.jl_JJ
African migration flows to Europe and North America vary in
composition. Europe claims the lion's share of Africa's internatio
2005 eight out of the 12 leading OECD countries were European,
accounted for 78.3% ofthe African immigrants led by France who
population was more than one and a half times the combined
populations of the United States, Canada, Israel, and Austral' .
Saudi Arabia is second only to France in the numbers of A ri
hosted in 2005 (1.5 million), followed by the United State
Kingdom, and Italy. In regional terms, Northern Africa boa t
of Africa's international migrants, followed by Eastern Africa,
Middle Africa, and finally Southern Africa. The three large
for each of these regions are France, Saudi Arabia, and Spain
the United Kingdom, the United States, and France for Easte
States, France, and the United Kingdom for Western Africa' lJArtllln'~1I
Germany for Middle Africa; and the United Kingdom, Au
States for Southern Africa (World Bank, 2005).
African immigration to Europe has generally tended t
and linguistic trails of colonialism, so that Britain, France, B"'.<I:;.IU;lJlll ,,g~,IIIU
were the preferred destinations of migrants from their for
the 1970s and 1980s that noticeable number of Africans be
European countries with which they had no colonial ties. A.I. ..'J.I'I.~;", "'.. ,I.....IIJ~,Ii_,,"'" .,' ..... ..,'-4
were Germany and the Netherlands. The leading African sou
these two countries was Morocco. By 1995 Moroccans had U"''-.VJl;J.I''',
immigrant group in Italy and Spain. Another African countr
the leading 15 sources of immigrants into the Netherland i
was. Somalia, whose numbers rose from 3,600 in 1990 to
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fastest growing immigrant population during this period. Somalia also featured
among the leading sources of immigrants for Denmark, and Finland. For its part,
Sweden became an important destination for Ethiopians, Ireland for Nigerians,
and Greece for Egyptians (GECD, 1998,2006).
Clearly,African immigration to Europe was markedbyincreasingdiversification
both in the number ofcountries sending and receiving the immigrants. Particularly
remarkable was the emergence of the southern European countries, principally
Italy, Portugal, and Spain, themselves longstanding emigration countries, as
immigration countries. This was as much a product of the improving economic
fortunes in these countries and their integration into the prosperity and political
sphere of Western Europe as it was of mounting immigration pressures on their
borders to the east and the south. Enclosed in a new European transnational space,
new identities of ethnicity and citizenship began to emerge that entailed creating
both symbolic and material borders to keep away or distinguish the immigrants.
The Europeanization of these countries and the rebordering of the Mediterranean
that it implied required the separation and stigmatization of immigrants from the
global South (Suarez-Navaz, 1997; Royo, 2005).
Equally rapid has been the growth of African migration to North America,
especially the United States. Prior to the 20th century, African migrations to
the Americas were dominated by slavery. After the staggered abolitions of the
European and American slave trades and the end of African forced migration,
only small numbers of Africans left the continent to settle in North America as
compared to other immigrant groups. For example, Tibbett Speer (1995, p. 36)
reports that "INS records show that in 1820 the first year a count was kept only
one person migrated to the U.S. from Africa. Sixteen more came throughout the
entire decade. The numbers climbed slowly until the 1960s:' From 1820 to 1993,
the United States only took in 418,000 African immigrants, while 345,425 Asians
came in 1993 alone. A systematic analysis of American census data covering the
period 1850 to 1990 shows that the number of African born migrants in the U.S.
population rose from 551 in 1850 to 2,538 in 1900, climbing to 18,326 in 1930,
35,355 in 1960,80,143 in 1970, 199,723 in 1980 and 363,819 in 1990,881,300 in
2000, and 1.25 million in 2005. As rapid as this may seem, Africans accounted for
a small proportion of immigrants to the United States-1.9% in 1990, up from
0.4% in 1960, and 2.8% in 2000 and 3.5% in 2005 (US Census Bureau 2001,2005).
In the meantime, there has been a precipitous fall in the proportion of European
and Canadian immigrants, and a sharp rise for Asian and Latin American
immigrants, which has provoked an anti-immigrant backlash (Huntington, 2004;
Perea, 1997; Suro, 1996).
The relatively low rates and levels of voluntary immigration from Africa to
the United States until the 1960s can be attributed both to restrictive U.S. policies








against non-European immigration and the reluctance and inability of colonized
African populations to migrate in any significant numbers outside the continent.
It is instructive to note that the largest numbers of African immigrants to the
United States in 1960 came from Egypt and South Africa. Both countries had
relatively advanced economies, had been sovereign for many years, and their
migrants were, in the case of South Africa, largely white, or in the case of Egypt
considered as white under U.S. immigration law. From the 1970s ignificant
changes began taking place in the regional and national distribution of frican
immigrants to the United States as Western Africa overtook Northern frica.
As Ikubolaje Logan (1987, p. 603) has argued, the largest number frican
migrants have tended to come from countries with «a large populati n' a pro-
western, capitalist outlook; speakers of English, rather than any other uropean
language; unstable economic conditions; a long history ofwell-establi h higher
education; and a colonial legacy that had not been too culturally domi nt.» It is
important to note that many African immigrants to the United Stat udents
who decide to stay.
Canada has also become an increasingly attractive destination
immigrants. Africa's immigrant population in Canada increased r
in 1981 to 166,200 in 1991. Between 1991 and 2001, 1.8 million n
arrived, 8% from Africa as compared to 58% from Asia, 20% fro
from the Caribbean, Central and South America, and from the Uni
growth of African immigration to Canada becomes clearer h
figures for annual inflows ofpermanent settlers. The inflows ofp rmanelll
from Africa increased 8.8% to 16% of total inflows.
African regional and international migrations are obviou I
older story, going back in modern times to the tragic days of th
trade when millions of shackled African men and women
Americas, at once a painful moment and a poignant metaph
the subsequent tapestry of African-Euroamerican relations, an
that for the victims and combatants of western barbarity, glob;aJ,.~~allon
start yesterday with the Internet. Contemporary patterns
migration are woven in intricate and complex ways in the 01
successive wave creating new layers of memories and mea
histories of Africa and its diasporas.
Causes, Courses, and Consequences ofInternational Migra .
What accounts for the patterns of contemporary African
and what is the impact on the immigrants themselves an
sending countries? Clearly, changes in both Africa-th icts,
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economic hardships) and social disruptions-are obviously important) so are
the transformations in the u.s. political economy and cultural ecology) primarily
related to the civil rights struggles. Quite literary) many Africans who migrated
from Africa to the United States from the mid-1960s owed their fortunes to the
doors opened by African American struggles. The Congressional Black Caucus
played a pivotal role in broadening immigration law to accommodate immigrants
from Africa and the Caribbean (Eissa) 2005).
In the literature on the causes) courses) and consequences of international
migration there are several theories) each employing radically different concepts)
assumptions) and frames ofreference that seek to explain the factors that first) initiate)
and second) perpetuate international migration) and third) that attempt to assess the
effects of international migration on both the sending and receiving countries. Some
emphasize economic factors and motivations; others offer political or sociological
perspectives and propositions.
The economic theories can be grouped into four. In the neoclassical economic
model, international migration is seen) at a macro level, as the result of wage
differentials and employment conditions between countries which) at a micro
level, propels individuals as rational actors making cost-benefit calculations to
migrate in pursuit of income maximization (Massey) et aI.) 1993; Todaro) 1976).
In contrast) the "new economics of migration)) attributes migration decisions to
households) not simply isolated individuals) seeking both to maximize income
absolutely and relative to other households and to minimize risks associated with
a variety of economic failures in addition to those in the labor market (Stark)
1991; Wallace) et aI.) 1997). As is common in much neo-classical economics)
these theories tend to reify migration) ignoring the historical, institutional,
and structural contexts in which it occurs. Often neglected in the neo-classical
economics literature is the role of the state in regulating migration flows through
its control over borders.
Proponents of the dual labor market theory argue that international
migration is caused not by push factors in the sending countries but by pull
factors in the receiving countries) by the structural requirements of the modern
industrial economies for low wage and low status jobs in labor markets that are
segmented and where the traditional sources of entry-level workers-women
and teenagers-have progressively shrunk (Salt) 1989). In contrast) the world
system theorists see international immigration not as the result of recent
processes of market segmentation in particular industrial economies) let alone
wage rate or employment differentials between countries) but as the natural
outcome of capitalist economic expansion that began in the 16th century. Besides
internal capitalist transformations and thickening external ties of trade) financial
transactions) transportation and communications) capitalist globalization
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also generates ideological and cultural linkages, constantly reinforced by mass
communicati<?n and advertising campaigns, which foster popular and seductive
consumerist images of the global North that stoke the circuits of international
migration (Sassen, 1988; Hamilton and Chinchilla, 1996).
These theories need not be mutually exclusive. International migration is
such a complex process that it cannot but be the result of equally complex forces
operating at various levels in space and time. There can be little doubt that
international migration flows are determined by conditions in both the sending
and receiving countries, including the state of the economy, political stability
and freedoms, and immigration law, all of which are affected by broader forces
in the global political economy. Whatever might initiate immigration, the
factors and forces that perpetuate it can be quite different. Several theories have
been developed to account for the rise of new conditions that emerge in the
cou,rse of international migration that sustain it and function as independent
causes for further migration.
The first is network theory, according to which the networks that arise in
the course of migration and which link migrants, former migrants, and non-
immigrants in sending and receiving countries through kinship, friendship, and
community ties constitute an expanding pool ofsocial and cultural capital that lower
the costs and risks and raise the benefits of movement, and therefore increase the
likelihood of international migration (Portes, 1989; Buechler and Buechler, 1987;
Boyd, 1989; Heisler, 1992). The second is institutional theory, which argues that as
migration expands profit-seeking and humanitarian institutions, organizations,
and entrepreneurs develop to service both legal and illegal migrants, especially as
restrictive immigration policies are adopted by the receiving countries, which serve
to institutionalize and promote international migration irrespective of the causes
that originally started it. The third theory, cumulative causation, maintains that
migration brings about changed social, economic, and cultural contexts, which
affect subsequent migrations. In other words, each migration decision is influenced
by previous migrations, which alter the regional distribution of income, land, and
human capital, the organization of productive activities, and the culture and social
meanings of migration and work. In the sending countries migration can become an
esteemed rite of passage, while in the receiving countries occupations dominated by
immigrants can become culturally labeled «immigrant jobs;' and therefore shunned
by native workers, thereby reinforcing the structural demand for immigrants (Massey,
et aI., 1998; Stark, et aI., 1986; Taylor, 1999; Stark and Taylor, 1989).
Once again, there is little that is intrinsically incompatible among the three
theories. Each explains an important dynamiC and dimension of the migration
process. It stands to reason that migration involves both social networks and
enabling institutions and is a cumulative process. The interplay between these
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factors obviously varies in specific contexts. Increasingly) international migration
has come to be seen as an integral part of globalization) or the phenomenon
known as «transnationalism:) a social process in which migrants establish social
fields that cross geographic) cultural, and political borders. Viewing international
migration from the transnational perspective has serious implications on how
immigrants should be viewed by both sending and receiving countries and how
migration is analyzed (Glick Schiller) et aI.) 1992).
As might be expected) there is no agreement on the consequences of
migration for the migrants themselves as well as for their countries of origin
and their countries of immigration. How do African migrants fare and adapt
in their new countries of settlement? What is the impact of their migration
on their home and host countries? Much of the literature has focused on the
economic dimensions of these questions. A variety of models seek to explain
the performance of migrants. One is human capital theory) according to which
education and training are important determinants of income and occupation.
Some studies inspired by this theory make claims of immigrant superiority) that
immigrants) even if they are not always composed of "the best and the brightest"
of migration folklore) tend to be self-selective and highly motivated) qualities
that are invaluable for adaptation and success. Others emphasize that immigrants
arrive in the host country with many handicaps) including sometimes l_ack of
language skills) knowledge of the job market) local customs) values) and the
social structure) which impedes their assimilation or adaptation (Chiswick) et
aI.) 1985; Borjas) 1989). Human capital theory tends to assume that economic
discrimination is irrational and exogenous.
Other theories take labor market discrimination as a given and seek to
explain it. One explanatory model sees it in terms of job segregation or closure
by dominant groups who limit the eligibility of new members to high-rewarding
occupations. The split labor market thesis postulates that the market is divided
along racial) gender and other hierarchized lines along which rewards are
unequally distributed. Immigrants are positioned accordingly. The succession
model predicts that a group that arrives last occupies the bottom position in
economic rankings as previous groups progressively move up the occupational
hierarchy. A version of this model, the queue theory) suggests that employer
preferences often determine rankings on the labor queue) which may result in
some groups being selected for jobs) which may be high paying. The rankings
are often determined by ethnic and racial characteristics (Waldinger) 1996).
Many studies show that there is a cost to being a racial or ethnic minority in the
Northern countries (Amissah) 1994) p. 31-42). From these perspectives) African
migrants can be expected to suffer triple subordination: as immigrants) as people
who arrived recently) and as people many of whom are black.
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Similarly, there is little agreement on the impact ofinternational migration on
the receiving countries. Suffice it to say, there are those, especially from the neo-
classical perspective, who see international migration as beneficial. It is widely
believed, for example, that West European economic recovery and boom in the
postwar period until the early 1970s was fueled by massive waves of immigration,
up to 30 million, many of them from Africa (Castles and Miller, 1993, p. 65-76;
Collinson, 1993, p. 47-50; Hollified, 1992, p. 45-73). It has been argued that
migrants are not only valuable in terms of boosting production, but also for
technological innovation. According to Gnanaraj Chellaraj, et aI., (2006, p. 251),
in the United States international students and skilled migration has «a strongly
positive impact on future patent applications and grants:' They calculate that a
10% increase in the share of international students raises patent applications by
4.7% and patents for universities by 6% and by commercial firms by 6.8%, while
a ten percent rise in the ratio of skilled migrants tends to increase overall future
patent applications by 0.8% and university patent grants by 1.3%.
But international migration can have its economic costs. There is considerable
literature that shows international migration depresses wages because of the
propensity of immigrants to accept lower wages than native workers and
their weak bargaining position either because of their insecure or even illegal
immigration status and lack of unionization. The phenomenon of«brain wastage"
in which skilled immigrants take up unskilled jobs is quite widespread. In the
United States, for example, «with some exceptions educated immigrants from
Latin America and Eastern Europe perform poorly, especially when compared
with immigrants from developing countries in Asia and developing countries"
(Ozden, 2006, p. 243). This is attributed to the quality of their education and
proficiency in English. Migrants are less likely to join unions, so that as their
share in the labor force grows overall unionization levels tend to fall (Lee 2005).
As with the causes, the consequences of international migration cannot
be confined to the economic dimensions. The profound political, social, and
cultural impact of international migration in the global North is abundantly
clear. National identities, political discourses, social structures, and cultural
dynamics have all been reconfigured, to varying degrees, over the last half
century of intensive migration especially from the global South who have
brought new races, ethnicities, languages, religions, foods, values, customs,
and practices. Immigration has challenged, but not eroded state sovereignty
in these countries. It is also clear that international migration has diluted old
certainties about the boundaries of national culture and citizenship, but this
has not generally resulted in the emergence of a more liberal postnational
citizenship, notwithstanding the fetish that is made of multiculturalism in
many Northern countries. Rather, there has been the rise of new racisms as
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the political and ideological temperature has arisen in the post-welfare state in
which right-wing populist movements and political parties are fueled in part
by irrational hatreds of and incendiary hostility towards immigrants (Messina
and Lahav, 2006; Freeman, 1998; Farer, 1995; Adamson, 2006; Gibson, 2002;
Messina, 1996; Betz, 1994; Soysal, 1994)
No less challenging is the question of the impact of international migration
on the sending countries. Two main positions can be identified. First, there is
a well established tradition of emphasizing the negative impact especially of
skilled labor migration-the brain drain-on these countries. The brain drain
represents not only the loss human capital, nurtured, and produced at great
public cost; it also deprives the sending countries of the cultural and social capital
for democratization and progress. This has led several scholars, led by Jagdish
Bhagwati (1976; Hamadi and Bhagwati, 1976; Bhagwati and Wilson, 1989;
Miyagawa, 1991), to devise strategies including taxation policies to reduce the
negative effects of international migration.
The second approach can be found among the proponents of the new brain-
gain literature, who argue that international migration confers "certain benefits,
including increased trade, remittances, knowledge, foreign direct investment
(FDI)-attributed in part to a diaspora effect-as well as the skills acquired by
return migrants in the destination country" (Schiff, 2006, p. 201). It is also claimed
that there the "brain drain" induces a "brain gain" in the sending countries in
so far as it "raises the expected return on education;' which «induces additional
investment in education" that) in turn, «may result in a beneficial brain drain
or net brain gain, that is, a brain gain that is larger than the brain drain; and
a net brain gain raises welfare and growth" (Schiff, 2006, p. 202). Much of this
work has focused on effects of migration and remittances on income, poverty,
and inequality, as well as on household capital and physical capital formation and
other productive investment and entrepreneurship.
Those who contend that migration promotes development argue that
remittances improve income distribution and quality of life by loosening
production and investment constraints faced by households in the sending
countries; after all, migration decisions are part of family strategies to raise
income, obtain funds to invest in new activities, and insure against income and
production risks (Keely, 1989; Arnold) 1992). Several empirical studies have
demonstrated positive effects of remittances in many instances (Adams, 2006;
Yang and Martinez, 2006). But there are also cautionary studies that indicate
more ambiguous outcomes that show the effects on education and health of the
families of immigrants can be negatively impacted. It has been shown in parts
of Mexico that children of immigrants may not get adequate health care and
attention and their children may reduce their investment in education as they
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anticipate migrating northwards (McKenzie, 2006; Kandel and Massey, 2002). In
short, the relationship between migration and development is multidimensional
and complex. Migration and remittances can have both negative and positive
impacts. They may reduce or reverse the lost-labor-and-capital effects ofmigration
if their size exceed the value of production lost as a result of emigration, and if
they enable economic agents in the sending areas to overcome capital and other
constraints on production activities (Schiff, 2006; Taylor, 1999).
The exact magnitude of international migrant remittances is unknown since
a large portion is not ~hanneled through formal banking systems or made up of
cash-transfers. Nevertheless, available estimates indicate that there has been rapid
growth in the volume of global remittances in recent decades, from less than $2
billion in 1970 to $70 billion in 1995, and $226 billion in 2004, of which $147
billion went to the developing countries, representing 1.7% of their GDP and
surpassing official development assistance The top five countries in combined
remittances between 1970 and 1995 were France, Mexico, Portugal, Egypt, and
the Philippines. In terms of regional distribution, Asia claimed 38% and Europe
33.1 % (United Nations, 2006).
Africa's Brain Drain and Its Developmental Implications
What is the scale ofAfrica's brain drain? Accurate data is hard to come by, although
this has not stopped speculation. According to a new database created by a team
at the World Bank, claimed to be the most comprehensive to date, covering 195
countries and 36 dependent territories, «the stock of educated immigrants has
increased by about 800,000 a year between 1990 and 2000 (the total stock of
immigrants has increased by about 1.7 million a year)" (Docquier and Marfouk,
2006, p. 155). The average world emigration rate has risen much faster for labor
with tertiary education than for that with secondary education; it is lowest for
labor with less than secondary. The result is that immigrants to the OECD are
more skilled than the native born, 31.2% compared to 21.9% in 1990 had tertiary
education, increasing to 35.4% and 27.6% in 2000, respectively.
Africa suffers from the highest rates of skilled labor migration. Africa's
stock of people with tertiary education is a mere 4%, yet this group accounts for
30.9% of all immigrants from the continent. The mismatch for the other regions
is limited to varying degrees but none equal the African pattern. The highest
shares ofskilled emigrants in Africa are from Southern Africa (62.1 %), followed
by Western Africa (42%), Eastern Africa (40.8%), Central Africa (30.9%), and
Northern Africa (19.6%). While only one African country features among the
top 30 skilled migration countries in absolute numbers-South Africa with
168,083 and in 29th place, nine are among those with the highest emigration
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rates: Cape Verde (67.5%») The Gambia (63.3%») Mauritius (56.2%») Seychelles
(55.9%») Sierra Leone (52.5%) Ghana (46.9%») Mozambique (45.1%») Liberia
(45%») and Kenya (38.4%).
Let me give the example of the United States. The African born population
currently claims the highest levels of education of any group in the country)
foreign born or native born. According to the 2000 Census) among the African-
born residents aged 25 and above) 49.3% had a bachelor)s degree or more as
compared to 25.6% for the native born population and 25.8% for the foreign
born population as a whole (U. S Census Bureau) 2001). The irony of people from
the least educated continent in the world having the highest levels of education in
the world)s lone) indeed) lonely superpower is quite striking. Some of the highly
educated African born residents in the United States consist of students who
don)t return to their home countries after graduation.
There is little agreement) however) on how well or poorlyAfrican migrants fare
in the country or the global North more generally. Different samples) methods)
and measures have yielded conflicting and confusing results. Disagreement has
centered on the educational and income differentials between African immigrants
and other immigrants and the host populations. One school argues that the
African immigrants compare extremely well with those of the host American
population and other immigrant populations. In a recent World Bank paper) it is
noted that migrants from Africa together with those from Asia tend to perform
better than those from Latin America and Eastern Europe because of the higher
quality of their education and proficiency with English (Ozden 2006).
In 2000) more than a third of African born residents were in managerial
and professional specialties) a fifth in technical, sales) and administrative
support) another fifth in service occupations) 4% in precision production) craft)
and repair) and the remaining 17% were laborers) fabricators) and operators.
In contrast) the occupational distribution for residents from America)s historic
backyard - Latin America) the Caribbean) Central America) Mexico) and South
America - are weighted to the less professional and managerial occupations
and include sizeable groups in farming) forestry) and fishing. Yet) in terms of
household income and poverty rates) African residents tend to do less well than
their educational levels would seem to suggest.
This suggests there is considerable brain wastage among them. Indeed several
studies of African migrant incomes using the census data of 1980) 1990) and 2000
show that mean earnings of African born residents were lower than their relatively
high levels of education and less than those of African Americans and Caribbean
immigrants (Amissah) 1994; Dodoo) 1997). This would seem to suggest that in
addition to a racial tax) African immigrants paya cultural tax) the devaluation oftheir
human capital in a societywhere things African are routinely negatively stereotyped
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and despised. One more reason why the African immigrants cannot escape Africa
and have to be concerned about its development: its shadows ofunderdevelopment
cast a pall over how they are perceived and perform in the global North. Clearly, the
odyssey of African immigrants is filled with both triumph and tragedy, fulfillment
and frustration, impressive successes and ignominious failures.
Even more contentious is the question of the impact of the «brain drain" on
Africa and what to do about it. Data from 2004 shows Africas total remittance
receipts had shot to $19.2 billion, accounting for 2.4% ofGD~ compared to the world
average of0.6%, 1.7%, and 0.2% for the less and more developed countries as a whole,
respectively. ButAfricas remittances comprised apaltry8.5% ofworld earnings. Except
for Nigeria which got $2,751, thereby making it third in the continental rankings, the
largest receipts went to countries in Northern Africa led by Morocco ($4.2 billion),
Egypt ($3.3 billion), Algeria ($2.5 billion), Tunisia ($1.4 billion), and Sudan ($1.4
billion). But as a share ofGD~ first place was claimed by Lesotho (25.9%), followed
by Cape Verde (9.5%), Guinea-Bissau and Morocco (8.5% each), Togo (7.2%), Sudan
(7%), and Senegal (6.7%) (United Nations, 2006).
These differentials reflect the divergent congruence of factors that determine
the volume and quality of remittance flows. Among the key factors are the scale
of migration, the educational quality of the migrants, and the development of
the financial sector of the recipient countries, which affects the transaction costs
of remittances. Whatever the private motivations of migrants, the sending of
remittances is both socially induced and market driven so it is important to pay
attention to the structural dynamics that affect flows. The North African countries
claim the largest share of remittances because they have the largest volume of
international migrants. This could also be because of they are located close to
major remittance-sending regions, the EU and the Gulf States, which reduces the
transaction costs of both migration and remittances (Niimi and Ozden, 2006;
Adams, 2007; Adams and Page, 2003).
Unfortunately, studies on the effects of migrant remittances on African
countries remain limited in scope and sometimes quality. Older studies focused
on a handful of countries with long histories of emigration such as Egypt
(McCormick and Wahba, 2001; Looney, 1990; Kandil, 1990; Aly and Shields,
1996) and Lesotho (Gustafsson and Maskonnen, 1993). More recent studies
focus on a growing range of countries that have not been traditionally considered
as emigration countries, such as Ghana whose rapidly growing diaspora in the
global North reportedly remitted an estimated $3 billion in 2004 (through
both formal and informal channels), or more than 40% of the country's GDP
(Mazzucato, 2005, p. 5). Similarly positive assessments of the role of remittances
have been made for the war-torn countries of the Great Lakes Region (de Bruyn
and Wets, 2006) and the Horn of Africa (Maimbo, 2006).
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The need for more extensive research that is both qualitative and quantitative,
micro-level and macro-level on the flows and impact ofmigration and remittances
(both formal and informal) in African countries cannot be overemphasized. There
are tantalizing lines of inquiry that deserve closer scrutiny, including the role of
migrants in direct foreign investment, the impact of international migration on
fertility rates, and the transmission ofcultural practices. It is now well established
that migrant networks play an important role in promoting international trade
in so far as they reduce informal barriers related to information about market
conditions and opportunities, not to mention political and cultural conventions
that affect economic transactions (Gould, 1994; Head and Reis, 1998; Rauch
and Trindale, 2002), but their effects on direct foreign investment is a subject
worth more investigations, certainly for Africa. Beata Javorcik, et ~l. (2006, p.
3) suggest that the presence of migrants, especially skilled migrants, "in the u.s.
increases the volume of u.s. FDI in their country of origin" because they serve as
a channel of information transfer that reduces transactions costs which tend to
be higher for investment than trade. «The magnitude of the effect is· economically
meaningful, as a one percent increase in the migrant stock is associated with a 0.3
percent increase in FDI stock. A similar increase in the number of migrants with
tertiary education increases FDI by 0.4 percent:'
Towards Diasporization and Brain Mobility
What can be done? It is easy to see African international migrations especially
to the global North as an unmitigated economic, political, and cultural disaster for
the continent. Remittances from them and other migrants, while important for the
families and communities of the migrants and sometimes for some countries in
their national balance ofpayments, do not seem to compensate for the net losses of
their productivity and potential contributions to national development. It has also
been argued that the skilled migrations deprive civil society of the organizational
political skills of middle class professionals. That explains, according to the critics
or cynics, why while African governments publicly decry the migration of their
professional elites, they do little to create conditions that would stem it.
All this may be true, but it forecloses the possibility that the migrants can
also be turned into assets for Africa. In so far as many of the migrants may not
return, despite the proverbial wishes of migrants to return home "someday;'
African countries and the migrants themselves need to devise creative strategies
that exploit and enhance the potential benefits of African skilled migration.
Demands on the Northern countries to compensate African countries for the
emigration of their skilled personnel and lost human capital, which have been
made, have not gone far and are unlikely to. Neither is the record of restrictive
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policies and return programs encouraging. Bonding schemes that require those
awarded publicly funded scholarship to return have not had much success either
in stemming the tide of skilled labor migration. Also limited have been the effects
of repatriation programs. For example, by the end of 1994 the program of the
10M's Return of Qualified Africans program had assisted merely 1,200 African
migrants to return to six target countries: Ghana, Kenya, Somalia (until 1991),
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, some of who, I am sure, eventually returned
to the trails of international migration. Only time will tell whether recent efforts
to negotiate temporary migration schemes between African countries and the
major labor importing countries in the OECD, will bear fruit.
African countries and international migrations have three choices. First, they
can continue bemoaning the «brain drain" and engage in mutual recriminations,
occasionally paCified by remittances. The second is to pursue ((brain gain" through
the return option in which international migrants are encouraged and enticed
to phYSically return to the continent. Reference is often made to the return of
Indian and Chinese professionals from the global North who have c~ntributed
to rapid economic growth in their countries (Mahroum, et aI., 2006)~ The third
is the «diaspora" option that recognizes the migrants as new diasporas and seeks
to build effective strategies of «brain mobility" or circulation between them and
their countries of origin and the continent as a whole.
This option needs to be based on a sober understanding of the mutualities
of interest, that neither Africa nor the diaspora can succeed in this ruthlessly
competitive globalizing world without the other, that the diaspora will
continue to be molested by racism and denigration as long as Africa remains
underdeveloped, and Africa only stands to benefit and accelerate its prospects of
development by maximizing the contributions ofthe diaspora, by recognizing that
the diaspora constitutes a strategic asset possessing enormous social, financial,
and intellectual capital, that in the case of the new diaspora it is already the
continent's biggest donor, whose remittances exceed foreign direct investment
and official development assistance, and it is the only constituency in the global
North that has a profound emotive and cognitive commitment and the capacity
to playa progressive role in Africa's social transformation, and in the case of the
historic diasporas that it has the political potential and propensity, which it has
demonstrated historically in struggles against colonial rule and apartheid, to
lllobilize in support of a new civilizational compact between Euroamerica and
Africa that was so cruelly disrupted and distorted by the Atlantic slave trade that
created that diaspora in the first place and the countervailing ideologies and
movements of Pan-African through which the diaspora sought to reconnect
itself to and help redeem Africa from European capitalist imperialism that its
own unpaid labor of four centuries had helped build.
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Africa and its diaspora have not always effectively mobilized to serve and
advance each other)s interests as has been the case with other diasporas. The
new African diaspora and their offspring who Mazrui calls in the case of the
American Africans can help invigorate the re-awakened interest in Africa among
the historic African American diaspora and serve as a trans-Atlantic bridge) as
cultural mediators between Africa and Africa America) whose communication
and knowledge of each other have largely been through the distorted lenses and
prejudices of imperialist and racist media that they do not control.
. Immigrant Africans) as workers and cultural agents) have an important and
specific role to play in brokering relations between Africa and the global North) in
blackeningthe Atlantic. They must resist the seductions oftheir new homelands to
become native ventriloquists) complicit authentic others who validate narratives
that seek to marginalize Africa. Nor should they let themselves be manipulated as
a fifth column in Euroamerica's eternal racial wars by disavowing the protracted
struggles ofhistoric African diaspora communities for the full citizenship ofracial
equality) economic empowerment) and political power. Sometimes immigrants
from Africa or the Caribbean tend to forget that the roads they ride on to their jobs
in industry or the academy were paved by all those brave men and women who
fought and for civil rights. Solidarity requires respect for each other)s struggles
and recognition of our splendid diversities anchored on a strategic collective self
interest) in so far as it is the denial of our full humanity that has produced and
continues to reproduce our collective exploitation and denigration whether in
Africa or in the global North.
,Migrant Africans should not be seen solely in the magisterial role of Edward
Said's cosmopolitan revolutionaries or the ministerial role of Ali Mazrui's teachers
subverting the global North through counter-penetration) or floating symbols
of Appadurai's various scapes. They belong to both worlds as economic workers)
cultural producers) and political agents who should) in solidarity with historic
African diaspora communities, construct practices) commitments) and knowledges
of their multiple worlds that demystify the roots of Africa's and diaspora Africa's
oppression and exploitation; that seek to empower their communities; that expose
and confront the tyrannies of Northern imperial power and Africa's dictators; that
promote respectful conversation between Africa and the global North.
What does this mean in practice? I hesitate to offer a detailed list of
prescriptions) not least because I am only too aware that Africa)s problem is often
not the lack of advice) of which it gets too much from both friends and foes and
foes pretending to be friends. Let me make a few suggestions that point to the
possibilities of turning contemporary African migrants from liabilities into assets
for African development based on the recognition that while many may not be able
or want to return permanently to their native countries they) like most migrants,
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often suffer from abandonment guilt which they seek to alleviate by continued
participation in developments at home. In days gone by, global migration often
entailed permanent relocation or long separation and infrequent encounters
with one's native home through mail and the occasional visit. The contemporary
.revolution in telecommunications and travel has compressed the spatial and
temporal distances between home and abroad, thus offering these new diasporas,
unlike the historic diasporas, unprecedented opportunities to be transnational,
to be people of two worlds, perpetually translocated, phYSically and culturally,
between several countries or several continents. Thus, globalization is not simply
facilitating the rapid flows of capital and commodities, but also revitalizing old
cultural and community networks, thus strengthening transnational ethnic,
racial, and national identities, interests, and interventions.
In this context it makes eminent sense to abandon restrictive and punitive
policies that demonize even criminalize international migrants, which have not
worked. It means providing dual citizenship to those among the new and historic
diasporas who wish for such formal citizenship rights that are empowering.
Indeed, taking up citizenship in their new countries of residence is critical if the
new diasporas are to influence, in any significant way, relations between their
host and home countries. It is not enough for African countries to court the
diaspora economically but shun them politically. The same goes for the diaspora.
It is self-indulgent to decry the alleged pathologies of Africa while reproducing
the same perversions including the cancer of tribalism in the diaspora, or fueling
them at home by supporting dictators and warlords and sponsoring conflicts and
wars as has happened most tragically in the Horn of Africa. It entails improving
the investment climate for the diaspora, beyond developing better instruments
for remittance flows. It requires devising creative strategies for knowledge and
skill circulation, the formation of national, regional, and continental knowledge
networks that facilitate brain mobility, from academic exchanges to consultancies
and temporary return migrations, to the transmission of information and
vigorously defending Africa which is routinely defamed in Euroamerica with
little social cost. In short, the diaspora constitutes Africa's eyes and ears in the
world, and an important mediator for the world to Africa. It is indispensable to
the globalization of Africa and Africa's globalization.
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